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I. INTRODUCTION 
Through East-Central Arizona runs a dying river.1 Diversions have 
reduced the river’s flow, and oftentimes, it is completely dry.2 Severe 
pollution has rendered the remaining water undrinkable, un-swimmable, 
and unsuitable for growing crops.3 Yet parties bitterly dispute who is en-
titled to this water.4 Copper companies use the water to operate mines,5 
while parties situated upstream of the degradation still use the water for 
agriculture.6 
Historically, the San Carlos Apache Tribe depended on the Gila 
River to irrigate crops and sustain a population of around 14,000 tribe 
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 1. GREGORY MCNAMEE, GILA: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN AMERICAN RIVER 17–18 (1998). 
 2. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff’d, 
117 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that upper valley water users “on occasion divert the entire 
flow of the stream”); Michael C. Blumm et al., The Mirage of Indian Reserved Water Rights and 
Western Streamflow Restoration in the McCarran Amendment Era: A Promise Unfulfilled, 36 
ENVTL. L. 1157, 1183 (2006) (“due to agricultural and municipal diversions, the river is largely a 
trickle”). 
 3. Arizona Water Settlements Act: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of 
the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources and the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 108th Cong. 41, 53 
(2003) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kathleen W. Kitcheyan, Chairwoman, San Carlos Apache 
Tribe); see also Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. at 1449–54 (discussing the significant 
degradation to the Gila River caused by low flow rate and high level of salinity); MCNAMEE, supra 
note 1, at 173–74 (“Manufacturing plants, airports, military installations, and sewage treatment 
plants have long disposed of hazardous wastes in the Gila and its tributaries.”). 
 4. See generally Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 405 (2007). 
 5. PHELPS DODGE CORP., LOACH MINNOW AND SPIKEDACE MANAGEMENT PLAN, UPPER GILA 
RIVER, NEW MEXICO 2 (2006), available at http://www.fws.gov/southwest/es/arizona/Documents/ 
SpeciesDocs/SD_LM/PD_mgmt_plan_Gila_8_22_2006.pdf. 
 6. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1431–32 (9th Cir. 1994). 
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members.7 The river is also sacred to the Tribe and central to the Tribe’s 
culture and spirituality.8 Initially, the federal government had recognized 
the Tribe’s dependence on the Gila River by reserving, under the Winters 
doctrine, water rights necessary to support the San Carlos Apache Reser-
vation.9 The Winters doctrine provides that the federal government, when 
creating a reservation, impliedly reserves for the tribe an amount of water 
sufficient to support the reservation.10 This implied reservation of water 
rights is based on an assumption that the government “intended to deal 
fairly with the Indians by reserving for them the waters without which 
their lands would have been useless.”11 
The Winters doctrine has been described as “the government’s 
promise, implicit in the establishment of reservations, to make them liva-
ble and to enable the tribes to become self sustaining.”12 If the Winters 
doctrine is a promise to the tribes, this Note is about a broken promise.13 
In the 1920s, in connection with the construction of the Coolidge Dam, 
the United States initiated proceedings to clarify water rights for users of 
the Gila River.14 Acting as the Tribe’s trustee, the United States entered 
into the Globe Equity Decree (the Decree), which prevented the San Car-
los Apache Tribe from claiming water rights under the Winters doctrine 
and awarded significant water rights to private parties and other Indian 
tribes.15 
This decree has been the subject of nearly a century of litigation, 
including decisions by the Arizona Supreme Court16 and the U.S. Su-
                                                        
 7. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, 
J., dissenting); MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 47–48. 
 8. Hearing, supra note 3, at 41, 53 (statement of Kathleen W. Kitcheyan); MCNAMEE, supra 
note 1, at 12–15, 46–51. 
 9. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
 10. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 116 n.1 (1983). 
 11. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). 
 12. FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.06 (2005 ed.). 
 13. Sadly, a broken promise is hardly a rare occurrence in the history of Federal Indian Law. 
E.g., MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 158 (“Indians have long been used to our trail of broken treaties—
of 370 signed between the 1780s and 1880s, not a single pact between the federal government and 
the Indian nations has been preserved in its entirety . . . [A] great many of these broken treaties have 
had to do with water.”). Indeed, in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized 
Congress’s right to unilaterally abrogate treaties. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903); 
see also John P. Lavelle, Sanctioning a Tyranny: The Diminishment of Ex Parte Young, Expansion 
of Hans Immunity, and Denial of Indian Rights in Coeur D’alene Tribe, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 787, 789 
(1999) (“They made many promises to us, but they only kept one: they promised to take our land, 
and they took it.” (quoting REX WEYLER, BLOOD OF THE LAND 65 (1982))). 
 14. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 15. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 16. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d 
882 (Ariz. 2006) [hereinafter Gen. Adjudication]. 
2013] Statutes of Ill Repose 1999 
preme Court.17 In particular, this Note focuses on the Federal Circuit’s 
decision in 2011 that the San Carlos Apache Tribe could not seek dam-
ages against the United States for improperly diminishing the Tribe’s 
reserved water rights to the Gila River under the Decree because the 
court determined that the statute of limitations had run.18 This Note ar-
gues that the case was wrongly decided. It then proposes two new analyt-
ical devices to overcome the recent trend of courts denying remedies to 
tribes based on supposedly unambiguous language of treaties, statutes, 
and decrees. 
Following this introduction, Part II provides historical and back-
ground information about the San Carlos Apache Tribe and the litigation 
leading up to the Federal Circuit case, San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Unit-
ed States. Part III tracks the Federal Circuit’s reasoning that the statute of 
limitations had run because the Decree’s plain language was unambigu-
ous and put the tribe on notice of its claim. Part IV critiques that reason-
ing and shows that the U.S. Supreme Court has been willing to find am-
biguity in similar language in the context of Indian reserved rights. Part 
V then argues for three more equitable approaches to ambiguity: first, 
courts should consider legal ambiguity, not just factual ambiguity, when 
determining whether legally operative language puts a tribe on notice 
that its claim has accrued; second, courts should take a unified approach 
to and treat all-encompassing terms as ambiguous when tribal reserved 
rights are at issue; and third, courts can apply threshold canons of con-
struction to determine whether ambiguity is present in the first place and 
whether the traditional Indian canons of construction therefore apply.  
II. HISTORY OF THE SAN CARLOS RESERVATION AND WATER RIGHTS 
LITIGATION 
Established in 1872, the San Carlos Apache Reservation is located 
along the Gila River in Arizona.19 The early years of the reservation were 
characterized by violence and abysmal health conditions.20 The army, 
                                                        
 17. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). 
 18. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1349–50. 
 19. Id. at 1356. 
 20. Gen. Adjudication, 127 P.3d at 885. In creating the reservation, the government forcibly 
relocated several Apache bands: “[T]he army . . . ferret[ed] out Apaches from their highland camps 
and march[ed] them to the reservation. . . . [Those] Apaches who did not comply were gunned down, 
the fate of some seventy Yavapai Apache women and children at the so-called Skeleton Cave Mas-
sacre of December 1872.” MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 109. In the relocation process, a thousand 
Apaches died and a total of six thousand Apaches “were finally herded onto the San Carlos Reserva-
tion.” Id. In the early 1900s, the Apaches “continued to die . . . [from] diseases like malaria and 
typhus and especially of hunger.” Id. at 112–13; see also JOHN GREGORY BOURKE, ON THE BORDER 
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who had forcibly relocated the Apache to the Reservation, referred to it 
as “Hell’s Forty Acres.”21 This small amount of land contained several 
rival Apache bands.22 It was not until the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 that these bands came together to form a government.23 Today, the 
San Carlos Apache Reservation remains one of the poorest reservations, 
with a majority of the residents living under the poverty line.24 Unem-
ployment is extremely high—around 68% as of 2005.25 
When the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the rationale of the Win-
ters doctrine, it almost seemed to have the San Carlos Apache Reserva-
tion in mind. The Court explained that without federal reserved water 
rights, Indian reservation lands “would have been useless.” 26  Indeed, 
without water for irrigation, the arid climate of the San Carlos Apache 
Reservation would have made development of agriculture difficult, if not 
impossible. When describing the reservation, one army officer comment-
ed that “[r]ain is so infrequent that it took on the semblance of a phe-
nomenon when it came at all. Almost continuously dry, hot, dust- and 
gravel-laden winds swept the plain, denuding it of every vestige of vege-
tation. In summer a temperature of 110 in the shade was cool weather.”27 
In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the United States further exacer-
bated the impact of these conditions on the tribes located there by de-
stroying and selling the most valuable irrigable lands on the reserva-
                                                                                                                            
WITH CROOK 129 (1971) (“Our government had never been able to starve any of them until it had 
them placed on a reservation.”). Government pollution of the Gila River has also contributed to the 
significant health problems on the reservation: 
[T]he Bureau of Indian Affairs routinely dumped electrical transformers containing poly-
chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) alongside reservoirs and cattle tanks on the San Carlos 
Reservation, where the streamside soil had long been contaminated by previous diesel 
fuel dumping. It will cost taxpayers at least $4 million to remove these carcinogenic ma-
terials from the soil. In the meanwhile, Apaches are again dying at the hands of the 
American government. 
MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 173–74. 
 21. Id. at 109. 
 22. CLARE VERNON MCKANNA, WHITE JUSTICE IN ARIZONA: APACHE MURDER TRIALS IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 105 (2005); see also THOMAS EDWIN FARISH, 7 HISTORY OF ARIZONA, 1–18 
(1918), available at http://southwest.library.arizona.edu/hav7/index.html. 
 23. See Corporate Charter of the San Carlos Apache Tribe Arizona, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE 
INTERIOR, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS (Oct. 16, 1940), http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/sancarchrtr.html. 
 24. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF INDIAN SERVS., 
AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE REPORT 36 (2005), available at 
http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc-001719.pdf. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963). 
 27. RICHARD J. PERRY, APACHE RESERVATION: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE AMERICAN 
STATE 120 (1993). 
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tion.28 The sales decreased the reservation’s size five times, and the set-
tlers who purchased these lands then began to divert water from the Gila 
River.29 Despite the Tribe’s objections,30 the United States then flooded 
22,000 acres of the most valuable remaining reservation lands when the 
United States began construction on the Coolidge Dam on the Gila Riv-
er.31 When the dam was complete, the flooding caused a “temporary fam-
ine” throughout the Apache nation.32 
A. The Coolidge Dam and the Globe Equity Decree 
In connection with the construction of the Coolidge Dam, the gov-
ernment filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona in 1925 to obtain a decree regarding water rights to the Gila 
River.33 The Tribe did not participate in the negotiations and was not a 
party to the proceeding.34 Instead, the United States used its power to 
represent the Tribe as its trustee and settle the Tribe’s water rights.35 De-
spite its fiduciary obligations as the Tribe’s trustee, the United States 
ignored the protests of the Superintendent of the San Carlos Agency, 
                                                        
 28. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, 
J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. 
 30. PAUL & KATHLEEN NICKENS, IMAGES OF AMERICA: OLD SAN CARLOS 117 (2008). 
 31. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 32. MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 150–51. Besides the reservation farmland, the lake also sub-
merged “tribal cemeteries, graves, and archaeology sites that contain and protect human remains, 
private homes, a grain mill, and other historical sites, many of which have significant spiritual and 
cultural meaning to the . . . Tribe.” Timothy J. Famulare, Note, Has Sandoval Doomed the Private 
Right of Action Under the National Historic Preservation Act?, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 73, 77 (2006) 
(quoting San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 868 (D. Ariz. 2003), aff’d, 
417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2005)). In response to the Tribe’s protest against flooding the burial 
grounds, the government proposed to disinter the bodies. FED. WRITERS’ PROJECT, ARIZONA, THE 
GRAND CANYON STATE: A STATE GUIDE 14 (1966). But the tribe vehemently objected to this as a 
desecration of the dead. Id. Ultimately, the Tribe assented to the government’s placing a concrete 
slab over the burial ground. Id. Later, the government’s release of water from the reservoir threat-
ened to expose these graves and damage the burial ground. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 272 F. Supp. 
2d at 889. The Tribe sued under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act 
(NAGPRA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) to enjoin the government from 
releasing the water and exposing the graves. Id. at 867. But the district court dismissed the Tribe’s 
case and concluded that the Tribe could not bring its NAGPRA claim until the release of water actu-
ally caused the disinterment of human remains. Id. at 889. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit split with the 
Third and Fifth circuits and held that the NHPA did not give the Tribe a private cause of action. San 
Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 417 F.3d 1091, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the court de-
nied the Tribe’s claim. Id. 
 33. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1348. 
 34. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in 
Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d 882, 896 (Ariz. 2006).  
 35. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1348. 
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who opposed the Decree because of the adverse impact it would have on 
the Tribe.36 Some federal officials, including the Special Assistant to the 
Attorney General, even stated that the United States should not support 
the Tribe’s superior priority to the waters of the Gila River.37 
In 1935, the court approved a settlement known as the Globe Equity 
Decree, which granted merely 6,000 acre-feet of water38 from the Gila 
River each year to the Apache Tribe for irrigation.39 The court rational-
ized this low award by stating that “the Apache are and always have been 
warlike and in no sense agrarian.”40 In contrast, the Pima Tribe, located 
on the nearby Gila Indian Reservation, received over 210,000 acre-feet 
of water per year because they “are an industrious farming race.”41 Non-
Indian interests received 350,000 acre-feet of annual irrigation water.42  
Although the reservoir and dam are located on the Apache reserva-
tion,43 the Tribe received no water storage rights for the impounded wa-
ters, which were instead apportioned to other water users.44 Further, the 
Decree stated that the parties “concluded and settled all issues” regarding 
water rights to the Gila River and that “all of the parties . . . are hereby 
forever enjoined and restrained from asserting or claiming—as against 
any of the parties herein . . . any right, title or interest in or to the waters 
of the Gila River . . . except the rights specified, determined and allowed 
by this decree.”45 
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Determines that a State Court Could Decide 
the Tribe’s Rights Despite Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
In 1974, private water users petitioned the Arizona state courts to 
adjudicate the water rights to the Gila River.46 The immense proceeding 
that followed, the Gila River Water Adjudication, is the largest and long-
                                                        
 36. Id. at 1356. 
 37. Id. 
 38. One acre-foot of water is “enough to cover an acre of land with one foot of water.” Arizona 
v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 557 n.22 (1963). 
 39. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1351. 
 40. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Famulare, supra note 32, at 77. 
 44. United States v. Gila Valley Irrigation Dist., 31 F.3d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Water 
can be released from the Reservoir only to the GRIC [Gila River Indian Community] and the SCIDD 
[San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District], not for use by the Apache Tribe.”); San Carlos Apache 
Tribe v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 2d 860, 870 (D. Ariz. 2003), aff’d, 417 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 
2005) (“[N]either the Apache Tribe, the San Carlos Apache Indian Reservation, nor any individual 
Apache Indians have any right to store water in the [Lake].”). 
 45. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 46. Feller, supra note 4, at 417. 
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est judicial proceeding in the history of Arizona.47 The goal of the adju-
dication was to “determine the quantities and relative priorities of all le-
gal rights to the use of water from the Gila River and its tributaries with-
in Arizona.”48 Over 849,000 parties received summons by mail, 24,000 
of which became parties to the adjudication.49 Although the San Carlos 
Apache Tribe was not directly served with process, the state courts still 
sought to bind the Tribe to the adjudication by joining the United States 
as the Tribe’s trustee.50 
To avoid this, the Tribe sought removal of the state proceedings to 
the U.S. District Court and injunctive relief preventing adjudication of its 
rights in state court.51 But the district court dismissed the case.52 On re-
view, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the “District Court[] [was] cor-
rect in deferring to the state proceedings”53 because the state courts had 
jurisdiction to decide the tribes’ water rights under the McCarran 
Amendment.54  
The McCarran Amendment waived the sovereign immunity of the 
United States and permitted state courts to adjudicate water rights held 
by the United States when the state court engages in a comprehensive 
water adjudication.55 Although the McCarran Amendment did not refer 
to Indian water rights or waive tribal sovereign immunity, the Court nev-
ertheless interpreted the Amendment to “provide[] state courts with ju-
risdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United 
States.”56 The Court acknowledged that Indian rights are usually immune 
from state court interference because state courts are notoriously hostile 
                                                        
 47. Id. at 406. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 407. 
 50. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 558 (1983). 
 51. Id. Other tribes pursued these remedies as well. Id. The tribes also sought an independent 
federal determination of its water rights and a declaration that the state could not decide the tribes’ 
rights. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 570. The Court stated that the district court was correct in deferring to state proceed-
ings “assuming that the state adjudications are adequate to quantify the rights at issue in the federal 
suits.” Id. The Court remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 571. 
 54. Id. at 570. The McCarran Amendment states, in relevant part: 
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the ad-
judication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for the 
administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the owner of or is 
in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by 
exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. 
43 U.S.C. § 666 (2011). 
 55. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 548–49. 
 56. Id. at 549 (citing Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976)). 
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to Indian rights.57 The Court also recognized that allowing state court 
adjudication of Indian water rights would effectively abrogate tribal sov-
ereignty by forcing tribes to defend their rights in state court.58 Neverthe-
less, the Court placed the policy of efficiency and avoidance of duplica-
tive litigation above these concerns.59 It concluded that the Indian water 
rights should be decided in state court because adjudication of these 
rights in federal court would duplicate some of the work in the state ad-
judication.60 
C. The Arizona Supreme Court Determines that the Tribe’s Water Rights 
Were Diminished 
After the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
of the case, the San Carlos Apache Tribe was forced to enter the general 
adjudication in state court to defend its rights.61 In the state adjudication, 
other tribes, copper companies, and municipalities sought to bind the 
Tribe to the Globe Equity Decree and prevent the Tribe from asserting its 
Winters water rights that the Decree had allegedly abrogated.62 The Tribe 
argued that it should not be bound to the Decree under the doctrine of res 
judicata.63 Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party is only bound by an 
earlier decree if it was adequately represented by a party to the decree.64 
                                                        
 57. Id. at 566–67. The Tribe made the following arguments: 
(1) Indian rights have traditionally been left free of interference from the States. (2) State 
courts may be inhospitable to Indian rights. (3) The McCarran Amendment, although it 
waived United States sovereign immunity in state comprehensive water adjudications, 
did not waive Indian sovereign immunity. It is therefore unfair to force Indian claimants 
to choose between waiving their sovereign immunity by intervening in the state proceed-
ings and relying on the United States to represent their interests in state court, particularly 
in light of the frequent conflict of interest between Indian claims and other federal inter-
ests and the right of the Indians under 28 U.S.C. § 1362 to bring suit on their own behalf 
in federal court. (4) Indian water rights claims are generally based on federal rather than 
state law. (5) Because Indian water claims are based on the doctrine of “reserved rights,” 
and take priority over most water rights created by state law, they need not as a practical 
matter be adjudicated inter sese with other water rights, and could simply be incorporated 
into the comprehensive state decree at the conclusion of the state proceedings. 
Id. The Court acknowledged that “[e]ach of these arguments has a good deal of force.” Id. at 567. 
 58. Id. at 578 n.9 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“If federal courts defer to state court proceedings, 
then the Indian tribes will be unable to represent themselves without waiving tribal sovereign im-
munity from state court jurisdiction.”). 
 59. See id. at 567. 
 60. Id. 
 61. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Newman, 
J., Dissenting). 
 62. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 127 P.3d 
882, 886 (Ariz. 2006). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996). 
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Thus, the Tribe argued that the United States failed to adequately repre-
sent the Tribe when it entered into the Globe Equity Decree on the 
Tribe’s behalf.65 Indeed, the United States had significant conflicts of 
interest in representing the Tribe along with other parties that directly 
opposed the Tribe’s rights.66 
Nevertheless, the Arizona court determined that res judicata applied 
and that the Decree precluded the Tribe from asserting claims for federal 
reserved water rights.67 First, the Arizona court determined that the scope 
of the Decree was broad enough to address the Tribe’s Winters water 
rights and not just the Tribe’s beneficial use water rights under state 
law.68 The Arizona court reached this conclusion even though the Decree 
did not specifically refer to federal reserved water rights or the Winters 
doctrine, and even though the United States had only explicitly asserted 
water rights under the theory of prior appropriation in the proceedings to 
the Decree.69  
Second, the court determined that the Tribe was bound to the De-
cree under the doctrine of res judicata.70 To reach this result, the court 
“decline[d] to consider” the Tribe’s arguments because by purporting to 
give comity to the federal court that issued the Decree.71 Although the 
federal court that issued the Decree had already declined jurisdiction and 
thus passed on deciding the issue,72 the Arizona court nevertheless ex-
trapolated, based on the federal court’s treatment of other opposing 
tribes’ claims for water, how the federal court would have decided the 
San Carlos Apache Tribe’s res judicata defense. 73  Thus, the Arizona 
court bound the Tribe to the Decree, effectively diminishing the Tribe’s 
substantial Winters water rights to the 6,000 gallons per day (gpd) limit 
in the Decree.74 
Although the Arizona court concluded that the Tribe could not 
claim federal reserved water rights under the Globe Equity Decree, the 
                                                        
 65. Gen. Adjudication, 127 P.3d at 897. 
 66. See id. at 897. 
 67. Id. at 903. 
 68. Id. at 892–94. 
 69. See id. at 888. While the Winters doctrine is a federal doctrine, prior appropriation is a state 
water law system that is used to determine the superiority of one water right vis-à-vis another. Under 
the prior appropriation system, water rights are prioritized based on the time when the diversion 
began. A senior water user therefore has a right to use water before a junior water user. 
 70. Id. at 895–903. 
 71. Id. at 901. 
 72. See supra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court affirming the district court’s refusal to 
hear the Tribe’s case in federal court). 
 73. Gen. Adjudication, 127 P.3d at 900–01. 
 74. Id. at 895–903. 
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court also implied that the Tribe might have remedies against the United 
States for improperly settling the Tribe’s water rights.75 Acting on this, 
the Tribe sued the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty.76 But the claims court dismissed the Tribe’s 
case based on the statute of limitations.77 In the latest chapter on the 
Tribe’s water rights, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dismissal in San 
Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States.78 
III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
The Federal Circuit dismissed the Tribe’s claim for damages 
against the United States because it determined that the statute of limita-
tions had run.79 Under the Tucker Act, a tribe’s claim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty is time-barred unless the claim is “filed within six years after 
such claim first accrues.”80 A claim “first accrues” “when all the events 
which fix the government’s alleged liability have occurred and the plain-
tiff was or should have been aware of their existence.”81 
The court determined that the Tribe should have been aware that the 
events leading to the government’s liability had occurred upon the issu-
ance of the Globe Equity Decree in 1935.82 The court rationalized this 
conclusion by (1) concluding that the plain language of the Decree would 
have put the tribes on notice of the events giving rise to liability, thus 
causing the claim to accrue; and (2) analogizing the case to Catawba, 
where a tribe’s claim was time-barred, while distinguishing Samish, 
where the statute of limitations did not prevent the tribe’s claim. 
A. Plain Language 
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the Tribe’s claim had in fact ac-
crued in 1935 upon the entering of the Decree, not in 2006 upon the Ari-
zona court’s decision.83 The Federal Circuit explained that “whether the 
pertinent events have occurred [for a claim to accrue] is determined un-
der an objective standard; a plaintiff does not have to possess actual 
knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the cause of action to ac-
                                                        
 75. See id. at 901 n.21. 
 76. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1348. 
 79. Id. at 1349 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2004)). 
 80. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2004). 
 81. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1350 (citing Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. Unit-
ed States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (emphasis omitted)). 
 82. Id. at 1351. 
 83. Id. 
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crue.”84 According to the Federal Circuit, the Tribe should have known 
of all of the events leading to government’s liability in 1935 by the plain 
language of the Decree.85 According to the court, the Decree’s terms 
“plainly and objectively indicate which water rights the Tribe did and, 
importantly, did not receive following the settlement of the Globe Equity 
Litigation”:86 
The Decree does not expressly grant any aboriginal or federal re-
served water rights to the Tribe, and, as the Tribe acknowledges, the 
Decree plainly identifies the Tribe as represented by the United 
States in the Globe Equity Litigation, grants the Tribe a total of 
6,000 acre feet of water rights, and includes a provision in Article 
XIII stating that “each and all of the parties to whom rights to water 
are decreed in this cause . . . are hereby forever enjoined and re-
strained from asserting or claiming . . . any right, title or interest in 
or to the waters of the Gila River, or any thereof, except the rights 
specified, determined and allowed by this decree.87 
Thus, the court determined that the Tribe “knew or should have known 
that the terms of the Decree precluded the Tribe from seeking additional 
Gila River water rights”88 and that its Winters water rights had been 
abridged.89 Finally, the court reasoned that because the Decree “plainly 
indicated that the United States represented multiple parties in the Globe 
Equity Litigation,” the Tribe should have known of the facts showing the 
United States’ conflict of interest at the time the Decree was issued.90 
B. Analogizing Catawba, Distinguishing Samish 
The San Carlon Apache Tribe court bolstered its plain language ar-
gument by analogizing the case to Catawba Indian Tribe v. United 
States.91 In that case, the Catawba Tribe sued the United States in 1990 
for breach of fiduciary duty. The United States had failed to notify the 
Tribe as its counsel that the Tribe’s land was subject to state adverse pos-
session laws after the federal Termination Act became effective in 
1962.92 Just four years before Catawba, the U.S. Supreme Court had de-
                                                        
 84. Id. at 1350 (citing Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 85. Id. at 1350–51. 
 86. Id. at 1351. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1353. 
 90. Id. at 1351. 
 91. Id. at 1353. 
 92. Catawba Indian Tribe v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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termined that the Termination Act subjected tribal lands to state adverse 
possession laws.93  
The Catawba Tribe argued that its claim had not accrued until the 
Supreme Court’s 1986 determination that state adverse possession laws 
applied.94 The Catawba court disagreed: it concluded that the statute of 
limitations began to run earlier, when the adverse possession laws were 
first made applicable to the tribal land in 1962, after Congress terminated 
the Tribe’s official status as a federally recognized tribe.95 The court rea-
soned that the Catawba Tribe had notice of its claim before the Supreme 
Court’s 1986 decision because the language of the earlier Termination 
Act was unambiguous in subjecting the land to adverse possession.96 Ac-
cording to the Catawba court, the Supreme Court’s later decision merely 
recognized the meaning of the Act’s plain language, but was not a condi-
tion precedent to the claim’s accrual.97 
In contrast, in Samish Indian Nation v. United States,98 the Samish 
Tribe was not time-barred from bringing its claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty. In 1969, the Department of the Interior had removed the Samish 
Tribe from the list of federally recognized tribes.99 The Samish Tribe 
then sought recognition and obtained relief: a federal district court ruled 
in 1996 that the federal government’s refusal to recognize the Samish 
violated the Tribe’s due process rights.100 In 2002, the Samish sued for 
monetary damages resulting from the government’s wrongful refusal to 
recognize the Tribe between 1969 and 1996.101  
The Federal Circuit determined that the claim was not barred by the 
statute of limitations.102 The Samish court explained that “the district 
court’s determination [in 1996] provides a predicate ‘wrongful’ element 
in this action.”103 Because the district court was the only authority that 
could review the recognition determination,104 its decision in 1996 was a 
“missing element,” without which the Samish’s claim for damages would 
not have accrued.105 Because the claim in 2002 was brought within six 
                                                        
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1570–71. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1570. 
 98. 419 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 99. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id.  
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years of the claim’s accrual in 1996, the complaint was timely.106 The 
Samish court stated, “If a necessary element to a claim must be estab-
lished in a different forum, the claim will not accrue . . . until that ele-
ment is finally established in the other proceeding.”107 
The San Carlos Apache Tribe relied on Samish to argue that its 
claim did not accrue until 2006, when the Arizona Supreme Court decid-
ed a “necessary element” of the claim: “that the Tribe was precluded 
from asserting its Winters and aboriginal water rights to the main stem of 
the Gila River.”108 Without the Arizona court’s legal determination that 
the Tribe was bound to the Decree and that the Decree covered the 
Tribe’s Winters rights, the Tribe would have experienced no harm from 
the United States’ inadequate representation of the Tribe during the 
Globe Equity proceedings. Thus, without the Arizona court’s determina-
tion, a necessary element of the claim would have been lacking: the ele-
ment of harm. 
Because the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s claim was brought within 
six years of the Arizona court’s legal determination of the Decree’s 
scope and effect, it should not have been time-barred. Nevertheless, the 
Federal Circuit distinguished Samish. It reasoned that the district court’s 
determination in Samish—that federal recognition of the tribe was im-
properly withheld—was necessary for the damages claim in that case, 
but that the Arizona court’s determination was not necessary to the San 
Carlos Apache Tribe’s claim because “the Tribe’s claim required no fur-
ther legal determination beyond the Decree itself.”109 According to the 
Federal Circuit, the Arizona court had not provided a missing element to 
the Tribe’s claim because the Arizona court had “simply stated what was 
readily apparent from the face of the 1935 Decree.”110  
While distinguishing Samish, the San Carlos court analogized Ca-
tawba by characterizing the Globe Equity Decree as “unambiguous” just 
like the Termination Act in Catawba.111 Just as the Supreme Court had 
relied on the plain language of the Termination Act in the Catawba case, 
the Arizona court had relied on the supposedly unambiguous Decree in 
determining that the Tribe’s property rights had been abridged.112 Thus, 
the Federal Circuit determined that the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s claims 
had accrued in 1935, when the Globe Equity Decree was issued. 
                                                        
 106. Id. 
 107. Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 108. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1352–53 (quoting Appellant Brief at 27). 
 109. Id. at 1353. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1354. 
 112. See id. 
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IV. THREE CRITIQUES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
The Federal Circuit erred when it affirmed the Court of Claims’ 
dismissal of the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s suit for three reasons. Section 
A explores the Federal Circuit’s implicit, unfounded assumption that the 
Tribe should have been aware of the terms of the Globe Equity Decree. 
Section B then examines how the Federal Circuit’s opinion effectively 
requires preemptive litigation, which in turn clogs the court system with 
claims that would not be considered ripe. Section C then shows how the 
Federal Circuit improperly deferred to the Arizona state court’s determi-
nation on the plain language of the Decree. 
A. A Catch 22 and an Unfounded Assumption 
In bringing its complaint, the Tribe was in the unfortunate situation 
of having to choose between a strong case on the merits of its claim for 
damages or a strong case on the statute of limitations issue. Proof that the 
Tribe offered showing that the government breached its fiduciary duty 
would also tend to show that this breach should have been apparent to 
the Tribe and that the Tribe should have been on notice that the claim 
had already accrued. In other words, if the Tribe made a strong showing 
on the merits, it would undermine its defense on the statute of limitations 
issue by showing that the claim was strong enough that a reasonable 
claimant would have noticed it.113  
Indeed, the Federal Circuit used several of the arguments on the 
merits from the Tribe’s complaint against the Tribe when deciding the 
statute of limitations issue.114 For example, because the complaint recog-
nized that the Decree allotted only 6,000 acre-feet of water to the Tribe, 
the court concluded that the Tribe knew or should have known that the 
plain terms of the Decree diminished the Tribe’s Winters water rights.115 
Similarly, in its complaint, the Tribe argued that the government’s reser-
vation of substantial water rights for other parties under the Decree, in 
contrast to the negligible water rights reserved to the San Carlos Apache 
Tribe, demonstrated that the United States’ representation of the Tribe 
was inadequate.116 But the court again countered that the contrast be-
tween the water rights reserved under the Decree also showed that the 
                                                        
 113. See, e.g., Whirlpool Fin. Corp. v. GN Holdings, Inc., 67 F.3d 605, 608 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(“[I]f a plaintiff pleads facts that show its suit barred by a statute of limitations, it may plead itself 
out of court under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.”). 
 114. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1351–52 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1352. 
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Tribe should have known that the claim had accrued at the time of the 
Decree.117 
The Federal Circuit’s clever manipulation of the Tribe’s arguments 
all rest on the frail assumption that the Tribe would have at least known 
the terms of the Decree in 1935. Even if the Tribe had a strong case in 
1935 based only on clear language of the Decree, it still would have had 
to have notice of the terms of the Decree to be held accountable for 
knowledge of its legal effect. But no reasonable plaintiff should be ex-
pected to bring suit over a dealing purportedly on its behalf, when it was 
not a party to the deal and all of the parties to the deal had an incentive to 
hide it from the plaintiff. 
That was exactly the case for the San Carlos Apache Tribe: the 
Tribe was not a party to the Decree, so it did not have notice of the De-
cree’s terms through the Globe Equity proceedings. Further, the nature of 
the Tribe’s allegation—that the United States breached its fiduciary duty 
and had a conflict of interest—itself indicates that the Tribe would have 
been unlikely to gain knowledge of the terms of the Decree. A fiduciary 
that breaches its duty has an incentive to keep that breach unknown to 
the harmed party. Indeed, the government continually maintained to the 
Tribe and to courts that the Decree did not address the Tribe’s federally 
reserved rights.118 
The court’s assumption also fails to account for the actual situation 
of the Tribe at the time of the Globe Equity proceedings and the unlikeli-
hood that a Tribe in such a situation would have been able to meaning-
fully obtain notice of the Decree’s terms. At the time that the court en-
tered into the Decree, the San Carlos Apache Tribe was a conglomerate 
of several different tribes that were each in tension.119 It was not until 
nearly a decade after the Decree was issued that the bands nominally cre-
                                                        
 117. Id. The court eagerly used the Tribe’s arguments against the Tribe, but the court did not 
appreciate how its own arguments proved the flaws in the Arizona court’s reasoning that the Decree 
bound the Tribe. The Federal Circuit’s determination that the Decree unambiguously diminished the 
Tribe’s water rights supports the finding that the government’s representation of the Tribe was inad-
equate and that the Tribe should not have been bound to the Decree. If the Decree unambiguously 
diminished the Tribe’s water rights such that the Tribe should have been on notice of its claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty, then the Decree also unambiguously indicated that the government’s repre-
sentation of the Tribe was inadequate and that the Tribe therefore should not be bound to the Decree. 
Because the Arizona court bound the Tribe to the Decree despite this inadequate representation, it 
abridged the Tribe’s due process rights. Thus, the Federal Circuit could not reach its result regarding 
the statute of limitations without showing the flaw in the Arizona court’s reasoning. Although the 
Federal Circuit sought to defer to the Arizona court decision, the Federal Circuit could not avoid the 
logical implications of its ruling—that the Arizona court was wrong. 
 118. Id. at 1351. 
 119. See MCKANNA, supra note 22, at 105; MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 47 (“[T]he Apaches 
were loosely anarchic, bound by clan rather than political ties.”). 
2012 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:1997 
ated a government to satisfy the terms of the Indian Reorganization 
Act.120 Before then, the Tribe had been described as a “broken nation,” 
suffering from inter-tribal violence, oppression from the U.S. military, 
and rampant disease outbreaks.121 In such a condition, it is unlikely that 
the Tribe could have had meaningful notice of the legal terms of the De-
cree when it was entered into.  
Finally, holding the Tribe to objective knowledge of the United 
States’ breach of fiduciary duty would effectively require the Tribe to 
constantly scrutinize the unilateral legal doings of the United States as its 
trustee during a time when the Tribe was politically incapable of doing 
so. In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court rejected an approach to the trust 
duty that would have similarly required a tribe to continually scrutinize 
the actions of the United States as its trustee.122 The Court stated that the 
Indians in that case were “in no position to monitor federal management 
of their lands on a consistent basis” because, among other reasons, 
“[m]any are poorly educated.”123 The Court concluded that “it was the 
very recognition of the inability of the Indians to oversee their interests 
that led to federal management in the first place.”124 Therefore, a “trus-
teeship would mean little if the beneficiaries were required to supervise 
the day-to-day management of their estate by their trustee or else be pre-
cluded from recovery for mismanagement.”125  
Although Mitchell II did not concern a statute of limitations is-
sue,126 the Court’s analysis in that case suggests that a tribe should not be 
held accountable for knowledge of the United States’ breach of its fidu-
ciary duty if the tribe was poorly equipped to learn of the breach. In other 
words, Mitchell II suggests a more nuanced approach to the notice re-
quirement and a contextualization of the objective standard. Under a 
purely objective standard, a beneficiary might always be held accounta-
ble for knowing the terms of a contract concerning the property of the 
beneficiary. But under a more contextualized approach that reflects the 
considerations in Mitchell II, such knowledge should not be presumed if 
the tribe was unable to monitor the acts of the United States as its trustee. 
                                                        
 120. See Corporate Charter of the San Carlos Apache Tribe Arizona, supra note 23. 
 121. MCNAMEE, supra note 1, at 112. 
 122. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 227 (1983). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. The main issue before the Court was whether a tribe who had been harmed by the 
U.S.’s breach of fiduciary duty was relegated to only prospective remedies, or whether the tribe 
could obtain monetary damages. Id. 
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B. Requiring Preemptive Litigation 
Because the Federal Circuit determined that the Tribe’s claim ac-
crued in 1935 upon entering of the Globe Equity Decree,127 the Tribe 
would have had to sue the United States by 1941 to meet the statute of 
limitations.128 At that time, the Tribe had not yet been held bound to the 
Decree, and therefore had experienced no harm.129 In effect, the court 
required the Tribe to litigate its claim preemptively, before it was 
harmed. 
To justify this unlikely result, the court first emphasized that a 
plaintiff need not have knowledge of the “full extent of the damage” for 
the claim to accrue.130 This argument distorted the Tribe’s situation prior 
to 2006 by implying that the Tribe at least knew that some damage had 
occurred, but merely did not know the extent of the damage. In fact, the 
Tribe did not know whether any damage occurred in 1941 because no 
court had determined that the Tribe, as a nonparty, was bound to the De-
cree. It was not until the 2006 Arizona court case that the Tribe was first 
bound to the Decree.131 Therefore, the Tribe did not know whether the 
Decree caused any harm until 2006. 
The court avoided addressing this lack of harm prior to 2006 by 
avoiding ripeness analysis. Although the court briefly acknowledged the 
Tribe’s argument that the claim was not ripe,132 the court did not address 
or refute the argument. Avoiding the issue was likely strategic: had the 
court determined that the claim was not ripe before the 2006 decision, it 
would have been forced to find that the statute of limitations had not yet 
                                                        
 127. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 128. Id. at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting). Actually, because the Tucker Act did not allow 
Indian suits against the government, the Tribe could not have sued in 1941. It was not until the pas-
sage of the Indian Tucker Act in 1946 that tribes were permitted to sue the government. In recogni-
tion of this, for five years after the passage of the Indian Tucker Act, the government permitted 
tribes to bring claims that had accrued before the passage of the Indian Tucker Act. Steven Paul 
McSloy, Revisiting the “Courts of the Conqueror”: American Indian Claims Against the United 
States, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 537, 547–48 (1994). 
 129. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1356 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 1354 (majority opinion).  
 131. Although the parties generally assume that the Tribe is bound to the Decree under the 
Arizona judgment, and this paper generally interprets the Arizona opinion accordingly, it is arguably 
questionable whether the Tribe is actually bound to the Decree under the Arizona court decision 
because the Arizona court did not fully decide the res judicata issue. In declining to decide an ele-
ment of res judicata, the court arguably declined to decide the overall issue, deferring instead to the 
district court. 
 132. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1349. 
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run because “a cause of action accrues for purposes of the statute of limi-
tations ‘when it is sufficiently ripe.’”133  
For a claim to be ripe, the damage must be “quantifiable and pre-
sent,” not “speculative.”134 At least “some damage” must be shown.135 
Prior to the 2006 decision, the Tribe could not have proven any damage 
because no court had determined that its federal reserved water rights 
were lost under the Decree. Granted, the Tribe’s hypothetical damage 
would have been “quantifiable” before 2006 because a court could have 
determined the value of the federal reserved water rights the Tribe might 
lose under the Decree. Nevertheless, this damage was “speculative,” not 
“present.” Indeed, the government’s longstanding position, that the Tribe 
had retained its reserved water rights under the Decree,136 confirms that 
damage was only speculative until 2006. By avoiding the issue of ripe-
ness, the court sidestepped the Tribe’s arguments that the its claim had 
not accrued because no damage had occurred before the 2006 decision.  
C. Improper Deference to the Arizona Court 
To support its conclusion that the plain language of the Decree noti-
fied the Tribe that its Winters rights were diminished, the Federal Circuit 
referenced the Arizona court’s determination that the Decree’s language 
was unambiguous.137 The Federal Circuit stated that the Arizona court’s 
determination “foreshadow[ed] our present decision.”138 But the court 
did not just cite the Arizona court’s determination to reinforce its deci-
sion. Rather, it relied on the Arizona court’s determination that the lan-
guage was unambiguous to support one of its key arguments: that the 
case was analogous to Catawba.139 
                                                        
 133. Franks v. Ross, 313 F.3d 184, 194 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Whittle v. Local 641, Int’l 
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 136. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 639 F.3d at 1350. 
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cree.”). 
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The Catawba court concluded that a tribe’s claim for breach of fi-
duciary duty was time-barred. Prior to the case, the Supreme Court had 
determined that the language of a statute was unambiguous and that the 
statute permitted adverse possession claims to the Tribe’s land.140 The 
United States, as the Tribe’s trustee, had previously maintained to the 
Tribe, contrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, that the statute did 
not permit adverse possession claims against the Tribe’s land.141 Accord-
ingly, the Tribe sued the United States for breach of fiduciary duty.142 
 The court determined that the unambiguous language of the statute 
put the Tribe on notice that its lands were susceptible to adverse posses-
sion claims.143 Thus, the statute of limitations on the breach of fiduciary 
duty claim began to run when the statute became operative, not when the 
Supreme Court made its determination regarding the effect of the lan-
guage.144 The Catawba court emphasized that the Supreme Court had 
determined that the statute’s language was unambiguous, which showed 
that the language of the statute gave the Tribe notice that it had been 
harmed, making the claim accrue upon passage of the Act.145 
The San Carlos Apache Tribe Court analogized the Arizona court’s 
determination that the Globe Equity Decree was unambiguous to the Su-
preme Court’s determination in Catawba that the statute permitting ad-
verse possession was unambiguous.146 But the Arizona court’s determi-
nation was not worthy of the same deference as the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in Catawba.147 Not only did the Arizona court fail to consider fed-
eral court precedent in determining whether ambiguity existed, it also 
ignored discrepancies in the timing of the reservations of water rights 
and the priority dates in the Decree, which indicated that the Decree did 
not address the Tribe’s reserved rights.148 Finally, the Arizona court de-
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 148. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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termined that no ambiguity existed even when the Decree failed to ex-
plicitly mention federal reserved water rights.149 
Moreover, in Catawba, the Supreme Court’s decision was not only 
binding on the Catawba court, it was also credible and authoritative be-
cause the Supreme Court had final appellate review over matters of fed-
eral law and Indian law. In contrast, the Arizona Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of a federal decree on a matter of federal Indian law could not 
be seen as credible or authoritative. In the 1983 case, Arizona v. San Car-
los Apache Tribe, where the U.S. Supreme Court had initially allowed 
state courts to hear the case, the Court acknowledged the bias of state 
courts.150 In the same case, the Court had also stated that state court cases 
“alleged to abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can ex-
pect to receive . . . particularized and exacting scrutiny.”151 The Federal 
Circuit’s passive acceptance of the Arizona court’s determination can 
hardly be considered “exacting scrutiny.”152  
V. HOW STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS CAN BE EQUITABLY 
REINTERPRETED 
At the heart of the San Carlos Apache Tribe case is the issue of 
how a court should determine whether a text is ambiguous such that it 
fails to put a tribe on notice of its claim and thus fails to cause the statute 
of limitations to run. In light of the result in San Carlos Apache Tribe, 
this Part argues for courts to adopt two approaches to ambiguity in feder-
al Indian law cases concerning statutes of limitations. Section A argues 
that legal ambiguity, not just factual ambiguity, should be considered in 
determining whether a tribe had notice of its claim such that the statute 
of limitations began to run. Section B argues for courts to apply thresh-
old canons of construction to determine whether ambiguity is present in 
text such that regular canons of construction would apply. It also propos-
es that courts take a unified approach to ambiguity according to Supreme 
                                                        
 149. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 150. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 566–67 (1983). The Court 
acknowledged that “Indian rights have traditionally been left free of interference from the States” 
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 151. Id. at 571. 
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Court precedent providing that broad language does not necessarily en-
compass specific, unmentioned, reserved rights of tribes.153 
A. Tolling Statutes of Limitations for Legal Ambiguity 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the statute of limitations began 
to run in 1935 because it determined that the plain language of the De-
cree gave the Tribe notice that the settlement would diminish its federal 
reserved rights.154 The court did not address whether the Tribe should 
have known that the Decree was binding and enforceable probably be-
cause courts had already established that the statute of limitations “is not 
tolled by the Indians’ ignorance of their legal rights.”155 Rather, courts 
are only concerned with whether the Tribe was aware of the facts giving 
rise to these legal rights.156 
The San Carlos Apache Tribe’s situation exposes the inadequacy of 
a rule that fails to account for tribes’ objective knowledge of their legal 
rights. First, the long history of litigation surrounding the Tribe’s rights 
shows that the current rule is incorrectly framed. In an almost accusatory 
manner, the courts frame the rule in terms of tribes’ “ignorance” of the 
law.157 But courts have used this justification even after cases have gone 
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 154. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. United States, 639 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 155. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 726 F.2d 718, 720–21 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 156. See id. 
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all the way to the Supreme Court for a definitive interpretation of law 
that is widely disputed.158 Indeed, the San Carlos Apache Tribe’s case 
reached the Arizona Supreme Court, which used the doctrine of comity 
to avoid the Tribe’s arguments under the inadequate representation ex-
ception as articulated by the Ninth Circuit.159 Thus, to say that the San 
Carlos Apache Tribe was ignorant of the law would in effect place blame 
on the Tribe for its failure to foresee the Arizona court’s use of the doc-
trine of comity to avoid its arguments that were grounded in federal 
precedent.  
But comity is a discretionary doctrine—courts are not required to 
use the doctrine in any given situation.160 Thus, it is unrealistic to charge 
the Tribe with ignorance of its legal rights because those rights depended 
on the court’s discretion. The Tribe could not have been held responsible 
for knowledge of how the court would exercise its discretion.161 Indeed, 
the Arizona court did not even decide the most contested issue—the is-
sue of inadequate representation.  
Further, even if the Arizona court had not applied the doctrine of 
comity, the “considerable disparity in federal Indian law has made . . . 
judicial interpretation unpredictable.”162 The Supreme Court’s inexplica-
ble failure at times to apply the Indian canons of construction is an ex-
                                                        
 158. See Catawba Indian Tribe of S.C. v. United States, 982 F.2d 1564, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 159. Generally, under the doctrine of comity, a court may defer to and respect the law or dispo-
sition of another jurisdiction, or it may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case until the court of 
the other jurisdiction has an opportunity to decide the matter. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 
269, 274 (2005). 
 160. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (“‘Comity,’ in the legal sense, is neither a 
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.”). 
 161. The only way that the tribe could have known that the state court would decline to decide 
the issue based on comity is if the tribe first anticipated that the federal courts would decline to de-
cide the tribe’s water rights and dismiss the tribe’s case, forcing the tribe into state court. But prior to 
the 1983 Supreme Court case, tribes were permitted to bring water rights claims in federal court. The 
Supreme Court’s 5–4 decision could hardly have been anticipated considering that the Court based 
its decision on policy, not on the plain language of the McCarran amendment, which did not indicate 
that federal courts could decline jurisdiction over tribes’ cases. Despite the plain language of the 
statute, the Supreme Court determined that federal courts should decline jurisdiction over native 
water rights claims. This faulty reasoning was compounded by the longstanding belief that state 
courts could not be trusted to decide these claims because state courts were oftentimes hostile to 
tribes due to historical differences between locals and the tribes. Thus, the tribe could not have 
known that the case would be in state court. Therefore, the tribe could not have known that the court 
would then use comity to decline to decide the inadequate representation exception but nevertheless 
apply res judicata. 
 162. Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based Upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal 
Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318, 354 (2003); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme 
Court’s Indian Problem, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 580 (2008) (describing Federal Indian Law as “an 
area of law that is often confusing, unpredictable, and prone to obfuscation”). 
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ample of this lack of predictability.163 Indeed, the Arizona court also 
failed, without explanation, to apply the Indian canons of construction. 
Tribes should not be held responsible for knowledge of an unpredictable 
judicial interpretation prior to a court’s decision.  
The San Carlos Apache Tribe case shows that the current rule, 
which focuses solely on factual ambiguity, is detached from reality. The 
rule does not account for the inherent unpredictability of the law, espe-
cially when the outcome of a case depends on a judge’s discretion. This 
rigid approach might at first seem to be a necessary expedient that reduc-
es litigation. However, holding parties accountable for knowledge of un-
predictable legal outcomes will ultimately increase litigation. Under this 
rule, tribes must bring their suits for breach of fiduciary duty before it is 
apparent from a court’s determination that any harm occurred. Parties 
would sue their lawyers or trustees just to prevent the loss of a claim in 
case a future decision showed that the representation was inadequate.  
Courts should therefore permit equitable tolling of the statute of 
limitations when a tribe cannot fairly be held accountable for knowledge 
of the law. A statute of limitations should be tolled when the fiduciary’s 
liability turns on an issue of first impression, when the language of a 
statute or decree is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion, or when the case is decided under a discretionary doctrine.164 Alt-
hough a tribe might fairly be held to have knowledge of the law when an 
area of the law is settled, the complexity and unpredictability of federal 
Indian law would oftentimes favor tolling the statute of limitations.  
B. Developing a Unified Approach to Ambiguity and Applying Threshold 
Canons of Construction 
Central to the San Carlos Apache Tribe court’s determination was 
its reliance on the supposedly unambiguous terms in the Globe Equity 
Decree, which the court compared to the unambiguous terms in the Ter-
mination Act in Catawba. In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court has some-
times found broad, all-encompassing terms such as those in the Decree to 
be ambiguous. 165  The first subsection in this Part explores one case 
where the Supreme Court found ambiguity in such a situation. It then 
argues for courts to follow this approach in the interests of predictability 
                                                        
 163. E.g., Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). 
 164. Alternatively, a court could look to a party’s legal sophistication to determine whether the 
party would have the ability to predict legal outcomes. Such an approach, however, penalizes parties 
that do gain knowledge of the law and encourages ignorance of the law because ignorance would 
help the party toll the statute of limitations. 
 165. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
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and for courts to determine that broad, all-encompassing terms are am-
biguous as to whether they address specific, unmentioned, reserved 
rights of tribes. The second subsection provides a framework for analyz-
ing ambiguity not just in the limited instances of broad terms applying to 
specific reserved rights, but in all cases of ambiguity. This latter subsec-
tion proposes several threshold canons of construction to analyze wheth-
er ambiguity is present such that regular canons of construction apply. 
1. A Unified Approach to Ambiguity of Broad Terms 
Mille Lacs Band provides one example of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
willingness to find broad terms ambiguous.166 In that case, a treaty be-
tween the Mille Lacs Tribe and the federal government provided that 
“the said Indians do fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the Unit-
ed States, any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the 
same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other lands in the 
Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere.”167 Although this broad language 
appeared unequivocal, the Supreme Court nevertheless emphasized that 
the treaty did not refer to hunting and fishing rights specifically.168 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded that the treaty did not abrogate the 
Tribe’s rights to hunt or fish.169 
The Court found ambiguity in the treaty’s plain language based on 
the historical context of the treaty.170 The Court then applied the Indian 
canons of construction: “Indian treaties are to be interpreted liberally in 
favor of the Indians, and . . . any ambiguities are to be resolved in their 
favor.”171 Further, the Court “interpret[s] Indian treaties to give effect to 
the terms as the Indians themselves would have understood them.”172 
Although “Congress may abrogate Indian treaty rights, . . . it must clearly 
express its intent to do so.”173 The Court provided a rationale for the can-
ons: “the United States treaty drafters had the sophistication and experi-
ence to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights.”174 
                                                        
 166. See id. 
 167. Id. at 195. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 200. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 196. 
 173. Id. at 202; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Neil Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., LexisNexis 2012) (“[T]ribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless 
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 174. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 195. 
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In contrast to the Mille Lacs court, the Catawba and San Carlos 
courts were unwilling to find ambiguity despite the complex legal issues 
that prevented certainty regarding the effect of the terms of the Termina-
tion Act and Globe Equity Decree. These disparate approaches create 
unpredictability in the law and cannot be reconciled based on the nature 
of the rights at issue. Had the hunting and fishing rights at issue in Mille 
Lacs been more important than aboriginal water rights of San Carlos 
Apache Tribe or rights to tribal land in Catawba, then one might argue 
that Mille Lacs merely reduced the threshold for ambiguity for rights that 
were deserving of greater protection. But the courts suggested no hierar-
chy of tribal rights. Indeed, the aboriginal rights and land rights in San 
Carlos Apache Tribe and Catawba, respectively, are vital to tribes’ sur-
vival and sovereignty, just as much as fishing and hunting rights. If any-
thing, water provides for a more basic need than hunting and, therefore, 
should receive greater protection. 
Without a hierarchy of protected rights, the cases cannot be recon-
ciled. Either these broad, all-encompassing terms are ambiguous in their 
application to specific protected rights of tribes, or they are unambiguous 
in their plain meaning and encompass all rights of tribes including re-
served or aboriginal rights. The more compelling approach is that of 
Mille Lacs not only because it is the most recent Supreme Court case on 
the matter. 
The Mille Lacs Court’s approach of finding ambiguity in broad, 
vague terms is more compelling for linguistic, intent-based reasons as 
well. An author or speaker may use broad language even while assuming 
that some topics are outside the scope of the discussion. The only way to 
clarify the status of a speaker’s assumptions is for the speaker himself to 
make them explicit. Thus, broad language should be considered ambigu-
ous in its application to specific reserved rights. This effectively places 
the burden to clarify such assumptions on the speaker, author, or drafter, 
who is in the best position to clarify them. As the Mille Lacs court rec-
ognized, “the United States treaty drafters had the sophistication and ex-
perience to use express language for the abrogation of treaty rights.”175  
In San Carlos Apache Tribe, recognition of the Decree’s ambiguity 
would have likely allowed the Tribe to pursue its claim for breach of fi-
duciary duty. Because the effect of the Decree would not have been con-
sidered plain from its terms, the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling would 
have been necessary to clarify the meaning of the Decree. Thus, the 
Tribe would not have had notice of its claim and the Tribe’s claim for 
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damages would not have accrued until the Arizona court’s decision in 
2006.  
Not only would a recognition of ambiguity have provided the Tribe 
a remedy for the deprivation of its water rights, it would also have made 
applicable the Indian canons of construction. These canons, in turn, 
would have favored interpreting the ambiguous Decree so that it did not 
cover the Tribe’s reserved water rights.176 Accordingly, the Tribe may 
have been permitted to claim reserved water rights to the Gila River. A 
finding of ambiguity could have very well prevented the deprivation of 
the Tribe’s water rights in the first place. 
2. Determining Ambiguity with Threshold Canons of Construction 
San Carlos Apache Tribe and Mille Lacs specifically concern the 
construction of broad, vague terms encompassing reserved rights, and 
this narrow situation can be addressed with certainty and predictability 
under the unified approach from Mille Lacs. But courts must determine 
ambiguity in many other instances. A broader framework for determining 
this ambiguity is necessary. 
The current framework—applying canons of construction only after 
a determination of ambiguity—needs reworking. Granted, through the 
Indian canons of construction, courts have sometimes been willing to 
view language from the perspective of tribes after a determination of 
ambiguity has been made. But these canons become useless when they 
are rendered inapplicable upon a finding that the controlling language is 
unambiguous: “When a statute is clear on its face . . . the canons of con-
struction will not come into play.”177 As shown in San Carlos Apache 
Tribe, courts have been more than willing to deny ambiguity in the first 
place, preventing application of the canons of construction to textual in-
terpretation in Indian law cases. Thus, not only must courts be given 
standards on how to interpret ambiguous language, they also must be 
given standards with which they can determine ambiguity in the first 
place: threshold canons of construction. 
If, under the canons of construction described in Mille Lacs, am-
biguous statutes should be interpreted as Indians would have interpreted 
them, then why shouldn’t the determination of ambiguity itself be made 
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 177. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02[1] (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
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from the perspective of tribes as well? If ambiguities should be resolved 
in favor of the tribes, then why should a close call regarding whether 
ambiguity is present not also be resolved in favor of tribes? A formalist 
would argue that ambiguity is an objective quality that can be determined 
without reference to the perspective of the reader. But the differing re-
sults over similar language in Mille Lacs and San Carlos Apache Tribe 
show that even courts will differ as to what is ambiguous. In other words, 
ambiguity of language is itself ambiguous.  
To determine whether language is ambiguous and whether the regu-
lar canons therefore apply, courts should use threshold canons of con-
struction. The threshold canons of construction proposed below track 
current Indian canons of construction as delineated in Mille Lacs and 
other Supreme Court precedent. First, doubt regarding whether a provi-
sion is ambiguous should be resolved in the favor of tribes.178 Second, 
treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders should be construed 
liberally in favor of finding ambiguity when tribal reserved rights would 
otherwise be diminished.179 Third, a doubtful determination on ambiguity 
should be resolved such that “tribal property rights and sovereignty are 
preserved” absent clear congressional intent. 180  Finally, courts should 
initially view text from the perspective of tribes to determine whether 
language is ambiguous.181 
Because the distinction between ambiguous and unambiguous lan-
guage is often elusive, as shown in the conflict between Mille Lacs, Ca-
tawba, and San Carlos Apache Tribe, a difference in perspective could 
very well change a court’s decision on whether text is ambiguous. In-
deed, applying any of these threshold canons could have made the differ-
ence in San Carlos Apache Tribe and could, in future cases, prevent the 
deprivation of tribes’ federal reserved rights. Although it is too early to 
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say exactly how each of these threshold canons would function in a given 
case, the starting point should be how the regular canons of construction 
on which they are based would function. Thus, to determine how the 
third and fourth canon should be interpreted, Mille Lacs is relevant prec-
edent.182 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Over decades of litigation, the San Carlos Apache Tribe has seen its 
rights adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Arizona Supreme 
Court, and finally the Federal Circuit. Each of these courts left the Tribe 
with fewer rights. They interpreted statutory language and the Globe Eq-
uity Decree against the Tribe, ultimately leaving the Tribe without a 
remedy against the United States for diminishing its rights to water that 
runs, or should run, through its reservation.  
This Note has exposed the flaws in the Federal Circuit’s reasoning 
in dismissing the Tribe’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against the Unit-
ed States. More importantly, it has offered three approaches for future 
courts to take in reserved-rights cases: (1) considering both legal and fac-
tual ambiguity in determining whether a tribe is on notice of its claim 
such that the statute of limitations begins to run; (2) finding ambiguity in 
overarching language alleged to affect reserved rights consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s approach in Mille Lacs Band; and (3) applying thresh-
old canons of construction to determine when ambiguity is present in 
Indian law cases. With these tools in hand, courts need not reach the un-
just result of the San Carlos Apache Tribe line of cases. Instead, they can 
interpret statutes in a way that protects tribes’ reserved rights while tak-
ing a realistic approach to the pervasive ambiguity of federal Indian law. 
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